We present the Simple Unified Policy Programming Language (SUPPL), a domain-neutral language for stating, executing, and analyzing event-condition-action policies. SUPPL uses a novel combination of pure logic programming and disciplined imperative programming features that make it easy for non-expert users to express common policy idioms. The language is strongly typed and moded to allow static detection of common programming errors, and it supports a novel logic-based static analysis that can detect internally inconsistent policies. SUPPL has been implemented as a compiler to Prolog and used to build several network security applications in a Java framework.
Introduction
Many computing systems incorporate policies that specify how the system should respond to events. Policies may be used to define, for example, who may access certain protected web sites, how to categorize arriving emails, or what remedial actions to take when the temperature in boiler #2 exceeds safe limits. When a policy needs to be changeable over the life of the system, designers often provide a mechanism to express it separately from the main body of implementation code. This mechanism might be as simple as a list of configuration parameters accessed by a GUI (e.g., the configuration panel for your email client), but in many cases it is a non-trivial external language in its own right (e.g., the configuration files for a Cisco router). Having a dedicated policy language makes it possible for relatively nontechnical users to write and review policies without needing [Copyright notice will appear here once 'preprint' option is removed.] to understand the underlying code. It also opens the possibility of using automated tools to analyze policies for properties such as consistency or completeness.
Many existing policy languages have evolved in the context of particular applications or execution environments and hence are domain-specific, "baking in" concepts related to, say, networks or access control. But in fact, policy languages often share common basic requirements and structures. This raises a natural challenge: can we define a domain-neutral policy language suitable for use in a wide variety of applications? Moreover, existing policy languages often appear very ad-hoc: they typically lack control abstractions, types and other static disciplines, support for modularity, etc. This raises another challenge: can we improve on these languages by applying ideas from programming language design? SUPPL, the Simple Unified Policy Programming Language, is our attempt to address these challenges. SUPPL is designed to describe the large class of policies known as event-condition-action (ECA) policies. The ECA paradigm, originally developed in the context of active databases [10] , revolves around a kind of event-handling loop. When some external stimulus generates an event, the policy evaluates a condition based on the current state of the world and its internal memory and decides what actions to take in response to the event. SUPPL uses a novel combination of (pure) predicates from logic programming, used to describe conditions, and imperative event handlers, which generate actions. Both parts work together to make expressing common policy idioms simple and understandable. The SUPPL language (and its implementation) are completely generic over the vocabulary of events and actions needed for a particular domain. These are provided by an ambient execution environment (coded in a conventional programming language such as Java) which is responsible for triggering calls into SUPPL code when an event occurs and for interpreting the action directives that SUPPL returns.
SUPPL is strongly typed, strongly moded, and locally stateless. All these features are designed to make SUPPL programs easier to reason about, and to facilitate the early detection of errors, either at compile time or in a separate static analysis phase. Despite its locally stateless properties, SUPPL is capable of expressing stateful policies by making controlled use of data tables that provide a principled point of interaction between the stateless logic-programming core and the imperative event-handling language.
SUPPL is also designed to allow easy combination of distinct policy units, perhaps written by different people. For example, both predicates and event handlers can be easily extended by additional, textually separate, clauses. However, these features make it possible to write policies that are incoherent-for example, an access control policy might generate both "allow" and "deny" actions in response to a request event. To report such possible inconsistencies, we have developed a novel logic-based static analysis called conflict detection, which is only feasible because we have a carefully-designed language specifically for policies.
SUPPL has been implemented as a compiler generating Prolog code that runs in a Java execution environment, which provides the realizations of events and actions. We have used this implementation in two different network security applications. The first is a prototype active network firewall built on the Linux netfilter stack, in which connection attempts are mediated by a SUPPL policy (an example policy may be found in the appendix). The second is the MRC/SOUND research platform 1 which uses active sensing to detect misbehavior on networks and introduction-basedrouting [15] to control access to network resources; SUPPL can be used to define various aspects of policy in this system, for example, what remedial actions to take when misbehavior is detected.
The detailed contributions of this paper are as follows:
• A tutorial introduction to SUPPL from the viewpoint of a policy author, using a simple example ( §2).
• The static type and mode system used for predicates, which is both simple and practical ( §3.1).
• A novel approach to integrating pure predicates and stateful event handlers ( §3.2).
• Conflict detection analysis, which combines program slicing and external automated logic solvers (SMT solvers) to identify potential inconsistencies in policies ( §4).
• Our initial SUPPL implementation, including the Javabased execution environment ( §5).
SUPPL by example
SUPPL is our attempt to build a general-purpose policy language as described in the introduction. It explicitly embraces the ECA paradigm; events and actions are primitive concepts in the language, and event handlers are the fundamental construct for initiating computation. Conditions are likewise a bedrock concept: the main programming abstraction is SUPPL is the predicate, similar to that found in logic pro- 2 Unlike Prolog, the SUPPL predicate language is pure (no side effects), strongly typed and strongly moded. Event handlers are written in a separate imperative vocabulary designed to make expressing policy decisions as natural as possible.
To give a flavor for how to use SUPPL, we will examine an extended example. Suppose we are writing a policy for a system that controls door locks in a secure facility. A person requests a door to open by using their keycard, and the system decides whether to accept the request and open the door, or to deny the request and leave the door locked. The system is also capable of raising an alarm, which will cause security personnel to head to an area to investigate a suspicious circumstance.
Primitives We can model these various concepts in SUPPL with a few declarations; see Listing 1, lines 1-10. We declare person, scanner, location and door to be primitive types. These types will have some concrete implementation in the security system, but they are treated as opaque by SUPPL. We also declare an event open door request indicating that someone has used a keycard scanner and requested a door to be opened, and an action to take in response, issue verdict. There are three responses that issue verdict can return: dispatch security, deny, or open door. These declarations (together with the other primitive declarations) form the interface between the policy and the system being governed.
To define any interesting policies regarding this security system, we need to have some operations that allow us to examine the properties of the opaque types. For example, we need to know which scanners govern which doors, where the scanners are, and the location to which the scanner gates access. Lines 12-17 of Listing 1 declare three functions from the opaque type scanner to doors and locations. It will eventually be the responsibility of the security system to implement these operations. Finally, we need to know who is allowed to be where. Listing 1 lines 19-20 introduce a predicate, authorized loc, which represents a relation between persons and locations. For now, we leave unspecified how authorizations are determined; thus the predicate is declared primitive. The in keyword is related to the mode system and indicates that uses of this predicate must pass the arguments in; modes are discussed in more detail later.
Event Handler Now we are ready to define a simple event handler for the security system (lines [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] . This handler says that when a open door request event occurs, check if the person is allowed to be where they currently are standing-if not, dispatch security. If they are authorized to be where they are, check if they are allowed to be where they are requesting to go; if so, open the door. If they are not allowed on the other side of the door, deny the request.
Every event handler starts by naming the event to be handled and binding the event arguments; the ?P form indicates a variable binding. The main body of the handler consists of a query statement with two branches. Each branch consists of a logical query on the left of the => symbol and a list of statements on the right. The first branch is entered if the person P is authorized to be in the location where the scanner is; otherwise the second branch is entered and security is dispatched to that location. In the first branch, another query is run to see of person P is allowed on the far side of the door. If so, the door is opened and otherwise nothing happens. In general, a query construct may have many branches; the queries are attempted in order and (only) the first one to succeed is executed. The underscore represents a trivial query that always succeeds. If no branch of a query construct succeeds, nothing happens.
Authorization Suppose we want to define the predicate authorized loc instead of making it a primitive. To do this, we remove the primitive keyword from its declaration and we specify rules that define when the predicate holds. The syntax for rules is quite similar to Prolog syntax. In particular, we adopt the Prolog lexical convention that variables group owns loc(G,L), group member(P,G). Listing 2. A more complicated door security policy begin with uppercase letters and program identifiers begin with lowercase letters. The code from Listing 2, lines 1-13, declares some new primitives and also defines the authorized loc predicate by providing two rules. (Note: for space reasons we have not repeated lines 1-17 of Listing 1.) A rule consists of a single predicate applied to some arguments followed by the :− symbol and a comma-separated list of clauses. A rule should be read as an implication from right to left. Thus, the rule authorized loc(P,L):− public space(L) means that "for all P and L, if L is a public space then P is authorized to be in L." When multiple clauses are separated by a comma, all must hold. So the second rule means that P is authorized to be in L if P belongs to some group G that owns L. Finally, the meaning of the predicate authorized loc is the disjunction of all the right-hand-sides of its rules. So, authorized loc holds if either of its two rule bodies hold.
The overall effect of this policy will be to allow persons into and out of areas for which they are members of an owning group. If someone gets into an area for which they are not authorized (by tailgating someone else, say) then security will be notified if they try to leave by using a keycard scanner.
Detecting repeated failures Now, suppose we want to prevent someone from doing a trial-and-error scan with their keycard; that is, we don't want people to be able to map out which doors are opened by a keycard by simply trying all of them and seeing which ones open. Such a pattern of use might happen, for example, if a keycard is stolen and the thief doesn't know what doors it opens. One way to mitigate this issue is to keep track of failed open attempts. If too many failed attempts happen within a short time frame, we want to dispatch security to investigate.
To do this, we need to keep some state about failed requests. SUPPL is, by design, locally stateless, so there are no mutable references or data structures we can manipulate within queries to keep track of this information. Instead, SUPPL includes a concept of data tables, which provide a principled way to implement stateful policies. From the point of view of the logic programming query language, tables are just another predicate that may be used in rules. However, the imperative event handling language has commands that insert and delete rows from tables.
We want to trigger an alarm if more than five failed attempts are made by a single person within an hour. To keep track of the required data, we set up a table and write an event handler to populate it (see Listing 2 lines 16-30). Table declarations are similar in most ways to predicate declarations; the columns of the table are given as an ordered tuple of types, just as for predicates. However, unlike predicates, tables behave much like the tables of a relational database: tuples are added and removed from tables explicitly rather than by defining rules. 3 The key keyword declares the table's primary key. The mode keywords following the key indicate which columns form the table's primary key: columns declared with the mode in are in the primary key and those declared with mode out are not. Every table will contain at most one row for the values in the primary key. If a new row is inserted with the same values for all primary key columns as a row already in the table, the old row will be evicted and the new row will replace it. Tables may also have an optional lifetime argument that indicates how many milliseconds each row should remain in the table from the time it was inserted (3600000 milliseconds corresponds to one hour). The eventid type is a built-in type that is used to give a unique identifier to each event occurrence.
The index declaration indicates that we intend to query this table by supplying the first column as an argument; the index declaration both interacts with the mode system (described below) and also suggests to the implementation that building an index for this table on its first column would be worthwhile. Unlike the primary key, a table index does not impose any uniqueness constraints.
Note that despite the strong similarities SUPPL tables have to the relational tables of a typical RDBMS, their use cases are rather different. SUPPL tables are primarily intended to be a place to stash short-term, "soft" data; the SUPPL runtime holds table data in memory and makes no persistence guarantees about it. Restarting the SUPPL runtime will clear all table data. In principle, it should be possible to have SUPPL data tables backed instead by a persistent RDBMS. However, a reasonable semantics for interacting with external RDBMSs seems to require distributed transaction support in the general case. We hope to examine these issues in future work.
Next, we provide an event handler that inserts a new row into the failed attempts table whenever an unauthorized person attempts to enter a gated area (Lines 22-30). It is perfectly acceptable in SUPPL to have more than one handler for a given event. When an event occurs, all its corresponding handlers will be run. The query illustrates the use of sequential evaluation to implement a form of negation. If the person is authorized, the first query branch succeeds and the handler does nothing (by executing skip); otherwise, the second branch is executed and the insertion is performed.
The primitive current event function 4 returns the eventid corresponding to the event currently being handled. Event identifiers exist primarily to support this use case, where we want to count the number of times certain events happen; giving unique identifiers to each event occurrence allows us to keep an accurate count. The result of this pattern is that we get a sliding window view of all the failed open attempts that have occurred within the last hour.
Note that the command to insert a row is spelled queue insert to indicate that the insert does not happen immediately. Instead, the table insert occurs after all handlers for the current event have completed. This is to ensure that there are no complicated and difficult-to-debug interactions between separately-defined event handlers. State changes are queued up and executed after all handers are finished, so that the next event that occurs will see the updated table state. Now we can write the excessive failures predicate that holds if a person has amassed too many failed attempts (lines 32-36). This predicate holds on a person P who has five or more distinct failed door open event identifiers in the failed attempts table. The excessive failures predicate relies on the primitive findall construct, which calculates a set of all the solutions to a given query. Here we use it to get a result set whose size we can then calculate using the built-in set size function. As used here, the findall can be rendered as "find all instances of EID such that P is related to EID (for some ignored scanner value) in the failed events table; place the result set in variable RS." In contrast to every other predicate construct, findall has explicit variable binding. Variables bound in the second argument (the search goal) may appear in the first argument.
With this predicate in hand, we can now modify our original event handler to respond to excessive failures (see line 44).
SUPPL in Detail
SUPPL's design attempts to balance a number of competing objectives, including: simplicity, expressivity, support for early detection of errors, and ease of combining separatelywritten policies.
The decision to use the logic programming paradigm, for example, is driven both by the need for expressivity (we believe that realistic policy conditions are naturally expressed using logic programming rules) and to make it easy to combine policies. As compared to procedures or functions, it is easy to extend the functionality of predicates by adding new rules. The handling of events is likewise easy to extend simply by adding new handlers-event handling logic does not have to be collected together in a single handler. The semantics of SUPPL are explicitly designed to make this sort of combination easy; in particular, the execution of sideeffects is delayed until after all handlers have completed, to avoid effects that depend on the order of evaluation. Obviously, we cannot guarantee that arbitrary independentlywritten policies will function well together, but we hope that the available language features encourage the use of idioms that make such combinations easier.
In the interests of both simplicity and expressivity, we allow arbitrary recursive predicates to be written. This makes the language Turing-complete. We likewise allow users to define custom recursive datatypes (in the style of ML or Haskell), in addition to using built-in datatypes for lists, finite sets and finite maps. This generality prevents us from being able to perform effective termination checking or give any sort of worst case time-bounds; we have decided the expressivity obtained is worth this cost. Further experience with SUPPL may lead us to consider restricting to a terminating subset of the language (e.g., predicates defined by primitive recursion on datatypes), but for now we leave such considerations to future work.
A slightly simplified syntax for SUPPL is presented in Figure 1 . There are four major syntactic classes: terms, clauses, handler bodies and declarations. Terms represent data values, while clauses are used to define predicates, and handler bodies are used to implement handlers and procedures. A SUPPL program consists of a sequence of declarations, which are used both to provide static information to the compiler (declaring types and modes for predicates, functions, etc.) and to implement the policy (rules, event handlers, procedure definitions). The meaning of declarations appearing in a SUPPL program is independent of their order.
Terms are quite similar to those of Prolog, although there are a few additions, including the variable binding form ?A, which is used inside handler bodies to make variable bindings explicit, and tuple data structures. Clauses also take inspiration from Prolog; the main syntactic difference is that disjunction is written with a vertical bar rather than with the traditional semicolon.
The operational semantics of the logic programming core of SUPPL can be understood in a standard way, as performing selective linear definite clause (SLD) resolution [19] with negation-as-failure [8] .
The parts of SUPPL that cannot be understood by analogy to standard logic programming concepts are covered in further detail below.
Predicates, Types, and Modes
Types and modes are primarily intended to help with early detection of errors. They make large classes of "shallow" errors (e.g., mixing up the order of arguments to a predicate) detectable at compile time rather than arbitrarily later after deployment. In addition, having a strong typing discipline makes it easier to interface with separate technologies (like SMT solvers) for discovering deeper program properties. For example, we can analyze a policy for conflicts by generating problem statements in first-order logic and passing these problems to standard provers (see §4).
The logic programming core of SUPPL is inspired by Prolog. However, SUPPL predicates are pure (in that they lack both side-effects and nonlogical constructs, like cut), welltyped and well-moded. Our type and mode systems are similar in some ways to those of the functional/logic programming language Mercury [23] and the constraint programming language HAL [11] , but significantly simpler. Having simpler types and modes makes the language easier both to learn and to implement.
Types built in to the system include number and string. There are also type operators list, (finite) set and (finite) map. For example, list(string) is the type of lists of strings, and map(number,list(string)) is a finite mapping from numbers to lists of strings. Users may also de-
foreach query
finite map | t 1 * · · · * t n tuple type | number numeric type | string string type
find all solutions
conjunction query | not c negation query This defines a new type named tree, together with two constructors node (taking two tree arguments and returning a tree) and leaf (taking a number and returning a tree). Every predicate in a SUPPL program must be declared using the predicate keyword; this declaration gives the types of the arguments to the predicate. Unlike in Prolog, a SUPPL predicate name may only be used at one arity; the predicate declaration fixes for the whole program the number of arguments and their types.
The type system of SUPPL supports Hindley-Milner style polymorphism [16, 21] , which is especially useful for working with parameterized datatypes, like lists. 5 For example, the length predicate relates a list to the number of its elements, and is polymorphic over the type of the elements. The type variable A can be instantiated with any type; type list(A) describes lists containing values of that type. All the type variables occurring in a predicate declaration (which are distinguished from type names because they start with an uppercase letter) are implicitly universally quantified, just as in, say, Standard ML [22] .
Modes are used specify what sort of data flow is allowed through a predicate. In particular, a mode expresses which arguments of a predicate are considered inputs and which are considered outputs. For example, consider the following predicate call:
Here we are calling the member predicate with a concrete list and numeric argument. Essentially we are asking the question: "does the list [1, 2, 3, 4] contain the value 2?" In this case, we are using both arguments in input mode. However, we might instead want the system to output the members of a list. We can do this by passing a variable into the second argument of member. Here we are asking the system to find all the values for the variable N that makes the statement true. In this case, there are four solutions, N = 1, N = 2, etc. Because we are asking the system to find values, we are using the second argument of member in output mode. However, there are some modes of use that member does not support. For example, if we wrote member(L, 5) we would be asking the system to find all the values for the variable L that make the statement true, that is, all lists that contain the value 5. There is no obvious algorithm for enumerating lists containing an arbitrary value, so we are not going to allow the member predicate to be used with its first argument in output mode. We can express the allowed modes for the length predicate by writing mode member(in, in). mode member(in, out).
Just as with types, the modes of all predicates in a SUPPL program must be declared. Frequently, only one mode will be needed for a given predicate; but sometimes more than one is appropriate, as with member. For each declared mode of a predicate, all the rules for that predicate are checked to ensure they respect the mode. Basically this check ensures that the body of the rule can be reordered in such a way that every variable is instantiated before it is used. Variables get instantiated by being passed as formal arguments to a predicate rule, by being generated as outputs from predicate calls, or via the equality operator.
Mode checking ensures that every predicate can be implemented as a nondeterministic program manipulating only ground data (i.e., containing no unbound variables) and ensures that "instantiation errors" (which can happen in an illmoded Prolog program) never occur.
Event handlers
The primary interface between a SUPPL policy and the system it governs is defined by events and actions. These are declared as distinguished identifiers carrying some number of data arguments. On the SUPPL side, events and actions have no predetermined meaning-their meaning is determined entirely by the surrounding execution environment.
In SUPPL, program execution is always initiated by an event; events happen when the system being governed wishes to interrogate the policy. When an event occurs every event handler in the program matching the event is executed, and the resulting actions are collected together and passed to the surrounding execution environment, which is responsible for performing them. The execution environment is also responsible for implementing all declared primitive functions and primitive predicates. The SUPPL semantics assumes that the execution of primitive functions and predicates is sideeffect free. SUPPL is "locally stateless," by which we mean that the only state in SUPPL programs is in the data tables that do not change during the execution of the handlers for a single event. Instead, the effects of any queue insert or queue delete statements appearing in an event handler are delayed until after all handlers for the event have completed.
As all program execution is event-driven, the event handler construct serves as the entry point for SUPPL programs.
handle event name(?Arg1, ?Arg2) => ... end.
In addition to event handlers, one may also define procedures to abstract over common code patterns. Procedures may be called in the body of event handlers. In order to keep certain aspects of our static analysis more tractable, recursive procedures are not allowed. A procedure must both be declared and defined.
procedure some proc(number, list(string)). define procedure some proc(?N,?L) := ... end.
The body of an event handler or procedure consists of a sequence of statements, which may be actions, calls to predicates, or commands to manipulate data tables. The two remaining syntactic constructs in the event handler sublanguage are the query construct and the foreach construct. Each of these executes queries against the core logic-programming part of the language. A query may have any number of branches; each branch corresponds to a query to run. In this example, the system will first try to execute the predicate first pred. The variable X must already be bound in scope, the system will bind Y in the query branch if the query succeeds. This corresponds to using first pred with mode (in,out). If the first branch fails (we can find no Y that stands in the relation first pred with X), we instead try the second branch and look for a Z that satisfies second pred. This calls second pred at mode (out). If this too fails, we pass into the third branch, and the trivial query succeeds, passing control into the final branch.
Note that query constructs explicitly have the semantics that the first branch whose query succeeds is executed, and only that branch. This captures a common idiom that is inconvenient to express in pure logic programming.
The other important syntactic construct that can appear in event handler bodies is the foreach construct. In this example, we are asking for the system to find all values for B such that some pred(A,B) is true. Unlike a query branch which succeeds as soon as it finds any solution for its bound variables, the foreach searches exhaustively for all instantiations of its bound variables, executing its body once for each fresh instantiation. Thus, one can think of foreach as a kind of looping construct -one loop iteration is spawned for each instantiation of the variables.
Conflict detection
Problem The extensibility of predicates and event handlers makes it easy to combine SUPPL code from different sources, but also makes it easy to write policies that are self-contradictory. The external runtime environment must choose some action (even if that is to do nothing) in response to an incoherent policy outcome, but without further guidelines, any such choice is necessarily arbitrary.
Consider again the door-lock policy from section 2. The main event handler (see Listing 2 lines 38-53) for that policy opens the door if the requester is authorized both to be where he is and where he is going. Security is instead dispatched if the user is not authorized to be where he is. Suppose we separately want to define a special class of persons that always have access to any door (perhaps the security personnel themselves need such access). One way to do this is to add the following predicate and handler. We assume the execution environment has some way to determine who currently has global privileges. Both of these handlers and predicates make perfect sense on their own, but in combination they can result in the policy both opening a door (because the requester has global access) and also dispatching security (because the requester is not authorized according to the authorized loc predicate). Such a result seems undesirable.
This conflict occurs because the policy author has introduced a concept has global privileges that he probably intends to subsume authorized loc, but has not ensured this is the case. It is therefore possible to have global privileges but still not be authorized to be in a location. We suspect that conflicts in real policies are frequently of this flavor: some intuitive expectation about how the policy behaves is not encoded in the policy document itself.
Solutions One approach to this problem would be to layer an additional mechanism for dynamic conflict resolution on top of the basic policy language. For example, we might provide a way to assign priorities to actions, and say that higher-priority actions "win" in the event of a conflict. But the details of such an approach become complicated: for example, it is hard to find a modular way to assign priorities (especially because ties must not be allowed), and it is not clear what to do about the actions that "lose." In general, we fear that relying on dynamic conflict resolution will lead to fragile, inscrutable policies where minor-seeming changes can have wide-ranging, poorly understood effects.
We would prefer instead to provide a tool that detects potential conflicts statically, so that the policy programmer can then use the existing facilities of the policy language to fix them before execution. Specifically, we focus on a static analysis that identifies control-flow paths through a policy that are initiated by the same event and lead to conflicting actions. For simplicity, assume that two actions are in conflict if they have the same name, but different arguments.
To see how this analysis might work, let us examine our example conflict from above in more detail. For the conflict to happen there must be some event that triggers both handlers; thus, assume open door request(P,S) has occurred for some P and S. The first handler must have control flow pass to one of the two branches that dispatches security. For now, let us consider only one of these, the one appearing in the outermost query construct. For this branch to activate, the previous branch must have failed, so authorized location(P,scanner loc(S)) is false. However, has global privileges(P) must hold for the other handler to issue the conflicting open door verdict. To rule out this conflict, we must prove a contradiction when has global privileges(P) holds but authorized location(P,scanner loc(S)) is false. However, we cannot do this; nothing in the definition of authorized location allows us to derive a contradiction. So our analysis should report a possible conflict between the two handlers.
We have developed a prototype conflict detection analysis for SUPPL that essentially formalized the line of reasoning outlined above. The analysis works in two phases. In the first phase, it identifies all the pairs of control-flow paths in the program that could possibly conflict. For each of these, it builds a formula in first-order logic that states what conditions would have to be true for the program to traverse both paths on a single event occurrence. In the second phase, these formulae are passed to an off-the-shelf SMT solver; we have experimented with Z3 [12] , CVC4 [2] and Alt-Ergo [4] . If the solver can show the formula is unsatisfiable, we know the potential conflict cannot occur. Otherwise (if the solver finds a model or runs out of time), we report a potential conflict to the user.
We have designed the analysis to be sound, in the sense that it reports all potential conflicts. This means that a policy that passes the analysis without complaint is guaranteed to run without conflicts. But to be useful in practice, it is crucial that the analysis also be as precise as possible, so that false positives are rare. Because SUPPL is Turingcomplete, the analysis cannot be complete, in the sense that it only reports genuine conflicts: some false positives are inevitable. Moreover, the particular SMT solvers we use may have limitations that induce further imprecisions. However, although we are still in the early stages of working with our prototype, our initial results on precision are promising.
Generation of Conflict Formulae
The problem definitions that get fed to the external solver break down into two distinct parts. One part is the definition of predicates in the program, which we call the background theory. This theory is the same for all problem instances. The second part consists of a formula corresponding to a particular pair of potentiallyconflicting control-flow paths.
Building the background theory follows well-known work in the semantics of logic programs with negation-asfailure. For each defined predicate, the analysis calculates the Clark completion [8] , which is a standard way to render the semantics of a logic program into a formula of first-order logic. It essentially formalizes the idea that a predicate is defined by the disjunction of its rules, while taking care to bind variables in the places that give the desired meaning. In other words, the Clark completion defines a predicate to hold if and only if it is established by one of its rules. Primitive predicates are uninterpreted in the translation; that is, they are declared but not given any definition.
The Clark completion procedure is sound (but not complete) with respect to Selective Linear Definite clause (SLD) resolution, the logical reasoning system underlying the operational semantics of Prolog and similar logic programming languages [19] . This means that every query answered by SLD resolution will be a model of the Clark completion. However, some models of the Clark completion will never be found by SLD resolution. 7 The soundness of Clark completion is sufficient for the soundness of our conflict analysis. Our analysis attempts to show that the Clark completion has no models corresponding to the control-flow paths in question; a fortiori a logicprogramming language based on SLD resolution will fail to activate those control-flow paths. Incompleteness of the Clark completion yields a source of false positives for the analysis (although not one we have encountered so far).
Consider, for example, the authorized loc predicate, defined by the rules below.
authorized loc(P,L) :− public space(L). authorized loc(P,L) :− group owns loc(G,L), group member(P,G).
The Clark completion defines this predicate by the firstorder formula below:
Note that variables corresponding to the predicate arguments are quantified universally at the outside, whereas variables appearing only in the body are quantified existentially at the level of the rule. If a rule body contains a compound term instead of a variable, a new fresh variable is introduced and an equality is added to the rule body.
Next we turn to the generation of the formulae describing conditions under which a specific pair of control-flow paths might be traversed. To build these, the analysis needs to determine all the control-flow paths through the program. This can be done via a straightforward walk over program syntax. It is easy to recognize all the entry points, which are the event handler declarations. Likewise, the syntax of event hander bodies is easy to analyze by a straightforward tree walk. Event handlers may call procedures, but since procedures are required to be nonrecursive, they can be handled by simply inlining their definitions.
For each control-flow path, the analyzer builds a data structure called a slice that starts with the event handler head and terminates with an action call. Next it compares all the slices pairwise to find those that start with the same event type and terminate with the same action type. Each such pair represents a potential conflict. 9 Given a pair of slices, the analysis must construct a formula describing what must be true for a conflict between them to arise. We defined a conflict to occur when the same action is produced with different arguments; therefore, the first thing to do is to state that the two slices have at least one distinct argument. If x 1 , x 2 , · · · x n are the arguments in one slice slice and y 1 , y 2 , · · · y n are the arguments in the second slice, then x 1 = y 1 ∨ x 2 = y 2 ∨ · · · ∨ x n = y n expresses that at least one argument is distinct. Now the analyzer traverses the slices to add the controlflow constraints. There are two syntactic constructs in handler bodies that contribute to this phase: query statements and foreach statements.
First consider query. When a slice passes into one of the branches of a query construct, two things are learned: first, the query for that particular branch succeeded; and second, all preceding branches failed. This is because the semantics of query constructs demand that (only) the first branch whose query succeeds is executed. If there are no variable bindings, the formula that results from both this positive and negative information is straightforward; the analyzer negates the queries of all the preceding failed branches and puts them 8 The actual translation is somewhat more complicated, but equivalant. 9 Actually, a single slice can conflict with itself if the foreach construct is involved; see below.
in conjunction with the successful branch query. However, when variable bindings come into play, care is needed to obtain the correct quantifications.
Consider the following fragment and assume that the analyzer is interested in a slice passing into the second branch. Also assume it has partially constructed a formula Ψ representing the slice from here downward. The slice goes into the second branch, so the first branch must have failed. In other words, given some fixed X, there is no Y that makes some pred(X,Y) true. The predicate expressing this is ¬∃Y. some pred(X, Y). Note that ∃ is nested under the negation. However, the second branch succeeds, so there must be some Z making both another pred(Q,Z) and Ψ true. This is expressed as ∃Z. another pred(Q, Z)∧ Ψ. Note that Z may appear free in Ψ and now becomes bound. This mirrors the lexical structure of variable binding from the program text itself. The conjunction of these two formulae expresses what must be true to pass into the second branch and follow the rest of the slice. The same basic pattern extends to cases with more than two branches.
The foreach construct works differently from query because it is essentially a looping construct. Every solution to a query will be explored in a foreach whereas a query will simply (nondeterministically) choose a single solution. However, for the purposes of finding conflicts between distinct slices, a foreach can be treated exactly the same way as a single-branch query.
On the other hand, a foreach construct can cause a slice to conflict with itself, as distinct loop iterations may result from the same static control-flow path. To handle this case, the analyzer must separately calculate formulae for selfconflicting slices. In this mode, foreach queries "fission" into a pair of slices that are exactly the same except that they bind distinct variable names. This corresponds to distinct iterations of a foreach loop.
For the particular example we have been examining, the conflict formula that is generated is: ∃P S. ¬authorized location(P, scan loc(S)) ∧ has global privileges(P ) ∧ dispatch security(scan loc(S)) = open door(scan gates(S))
Asserting facts Sometimes the conflict detection system will report a conflict where none exists because it has no way to analyze the policy primitives. The user knows, for example, that the following two primitive predicates are mutually exclusive. To inform the analysis of this fact, we can assert an axiom.
axiom not hourly employee(P) | not salary employee(P).
Now, the analysis can use this fact when trying to show that conflicts cannot occur. Of course, the user must be careful only to assert axioms that actually are true of the implemented primitives-otherwise the analysis may get incorrect results. In particular, the user must be careful not to assert axioms that are contradictory, or the analysis results will be nonsense.
Another way to assert a fact to the SUPPL analyzer is using the lemma keyword. A lemma, like an axiom, will be used in later analysis phases. However a lemma also produces a new proof obligation in the analysis phase.
Suppose we define a predicate that indicates which employees are eligible for overtime.
primitive predicate worked this week (person in, number out). predicate overtime eligible(person in).
overtime eligible(P) :− hourly employee(P), worked this week(P,N), N >= 40.
Now, salaried employees are never eligible for overtime, because a salaried employee cannot be hourly. We can state a lemma to that effect. lemma salary employee(P) −> not overtime eligible(P).
This lemma follows from the axiom above and the definition of overtime eligible. Lemmas can help guide an automatic prover toward discovering useful facts it might otherwise not find in time. They can also be a useful tool for documenting properties that a user expects to hold of a policy. For example, if a later change to the overtime eligible predicate caused it to hold for some salaried employees, the lemma would no longer be provable, indicating a problem.
External Solver In order to ease interfacing with back-end provers, we make use of the Why3 program verification system [6] . Why3 understands all the concepts we need to express SUPPL programs: first-order logic, recursive datatypes, parametric polymorphism, numbers, sets, etc. For us, the main reason to use Why3 is that it can translate all these concepts into forms that can be understood by back-end SMT solvers; in particular, Why3 knows how to perform the tricky transformations that are needed to remove parametric polymorphism, which is not supported natively by most SMT solvers (Alt-Ergo seems to be the sole exception [5] ).
Once our conflict detection problems are exported in Why3 format, we can use the Why3 system to dispatch the problems to a variety of solvers, including: CVC4, Alt-Ergo, Z3, and many others. Problems may even be translated into a form suitable to manual proof in Coq and Isabelle/HOL, if desired.
Discussion As noted above, we cannot hope to have a complete procedure for finding conflicts, and false positives are inevitable. However, even if the problem were decidable, using SMT solvers means that, as a practical matter, we cannot expect to always get back answers in a reasonable amount of time.
Nonetheless, our limited experience so far has given us promising results; CVC4, especially, seems to do well at discharging the problem instances we build. We tested a number of different ways to address the conflict in our door lock policy from above (and for other similar policies) -for each solution we tried, a solver was able to prove the conflict could not occur using less than 1 second of runtime.
We do not yet have any data about how this analysis system scales to large policies. The number of potential conflicts is quadratic in the number of control-flow paths in a program, but this may be acceptable for realistic policies.
Conflict detection for policies is important in its own right. However, the potential applications for our analysis pipeline go further. For example, lemmas can be used simply to document properties of a policy that a user expects to be true; over time, as a policy is modified, if the lemma is falsified by some change, the analysis will indicate if the lemma can no longer be proved, indicating a problem. In future work we hope to explore other avenues for analysis, including liveness properties and data invariants.
Implementation
The implementation of SUPPL is divided into two parts: a frontend compiler that takes SUPPL code and produces an executable Prolog policy; and a backend runtime system. The compiler is a standalone application written in Haskell, whereas the runtime is built on top of the tuProlog interpreter [13] , which is written in Java.
The most complicated tasks performed by the frontend compiler involve implementing the static type and mode disciplines. The type system is essentially a first-order variant of Hendly-Milner polymorphism. The implementation of the type system closely follows the main ideas of the classic type inference algorithm W [21] .
The mode system is responsible for ensuring that each predicate defined in a policy respects its stated modes. In fact, the term "mode checking" is a slight misnomer, because each mode for a predicate actually causes different code to be generated. This is because mode checking works by literally rearranging the clauses of rules until data flows strictly from left to right. The algorithm we use for mode checking is extremely naive-we simply explore all rearrangements of the rule body until we find one that satisfies the dataflow constraints. Although this takes worst-case time exponential in the number of clauses, it seems to perform well enough in practice.
In the end, the output of the SUPPL compiler is a Prolog file intended to be loaded into the runtime system. The compiler, when run in conflict detection mode, is also responsible for producing the Why3 specification file encoding the conflict analysis problems.
As SUPPL is designed to be agnostic to the problem domain to which it is being applied, it is important that it be easy to extend the language with problem-specific programming facilities and to interface with an external system that generates the events and implements the actions returned by a SUPPL program. In order to make this interface as easy as possible and to support the basic logic-programming facilities need for SUPPL semantics, our runtime system for SUPPL is based on the tuProlog system [13] , a Prolog interpreter written in Java, which has a well-designed external function interface.
To implement SUPPL primitive functions and predicates, one simply writes a Java class with some methods with the correct names using the tuProlog's Java-side API, and arrange for the custom class to be loaded into the interpreter. The interpreter engine uses Java reflection to find the external functions and execute them when required.
The workflow for building and executing a policy program is as follows:
i. Define the interface between the SUPPL policy and the external system by declaring primitives, types, events and actions.
ii. Write the actual policy code by implementing predicates and event handlers.
iii. Implement any required primitive code in Java and/or Prolog and write interface code for feeding events into the SUPPL runtime engine and handling the resulting action directives.
iv. Use the SUPPL compiler on the policy code to produce executable Prolog code, which is then loaded into the SUPPL runtime environment.
Naturally, these steps will overlap and iterate in a realistic scenario. The executable part of SUPPL is deliberately quite similar to Prolog, and the mapping between SUPPL data structures and Prolog data structures is nearly trivial. The connection between the Java API and Prolog data structures is a little more distant, but the tuProlog API for manipulating Prolog terms is relatively easy to use. To get a flavor for the required interface programming, consider the following example file, which implements a simple primitive predicate named primOp at two different modes. SUPPL data constructs, as well as action and event instances, are all represented directly as functor applications in Prolog; lists and numbers are handled natively by the Prolog system. Strings are interpreted in Prolog as atoms.
In the tuProlog API, the Struct class (a subclass of Term) is used to represent atoms, lists and functor applications. In the code above new Struct("mkAsdf",arg1) constructs a new Prolog functor instance with name mkAsdf and a single argument, represented by arg1. This maps directly onto a SUPPL term built using the mkAsdf data constructor. The class Number (also a Term subclass) is used to represent numeric values. Primitive SUPPL types can be represented by arbitrary Java objects. These objects will be passed around by reference inside the policy code; the runtime will make use only of basic Java Object methods, like equals and hashCode.
Using a Prolog interpreter in this way is a relatively heavyweight implementation strategy and will be unsuitable for applications requiring very frequent policy queries or which have tight real-time deadlines. So, it would almost certainly not be acceptable for, say, a firewall to query a SUPPL policy every time a packet arrives; however, it may be acceptable to query the policy every time a new connection is opened.
The result of this design is that it should be easy to integrate SUPPL-defined policies into existing Java applications whenever policy questions can be organized into the eventcondition-action paradigm. In addition, only modest changes to the SUPPL compiler should be required to target other Prolog systems, e.g., the GNU Prolog compiler, gprolog. This would allow integration with applications written in C rather than Java, as gprolog has a C foreign language interface.
Related work
The idea of building a generic policy language is not new. Here we survey existing work including both explicitly domain-neutral languages and languages that were designed for network security applications but can easily be generalized to broader domains.
Generic policy languages The Policy Description Language (PDL) [20] is similar in many ways to SUPPL; it is based on the ECA policy paradigm, is strongly influenced by logic programming ideas and is also designed with ease of analysis in mind. PDL has only one form of rule declaration, which states that an event causes a particular action provided that some condition holds. A significant difference from SUPPL is that PDL lacks any explicit notion of state; instead, time-varying policies can be written using rules that match on event sets that can examine events that occurred in the past. SUPPL event handlers can only examine the current event, but data tables allow a principled way to record information for later examination.
Ponder [9] is a language for expressing security policies interacting at various levels of the hardware/software stack: for example, network firewalls, databases and Java runtime security. Ponder's approach to specifying policy is quite different to ours; it has a strongly-developed object model for expressing roles, groups, membership, etc. and many built-in constructs for manipulating these objects. In contrast, SUPPL builds in nothing except primitive base types, and instead relies on the user (or a library author) to build a model of the problem domain in question. We believe this makes the language easier to use, as there are fewer moving parts to learn.
Network security The Authorization Specification Language (ASL) [18] is a language for expressing certain kinds of access control policies. Like SUPPL, it takes inspiration from logic programming constructs, and the primary act of programming in ASL involves writing various kinds of rules: authorization rules, access control rules, data integrity rules, etc. ASL allows users to express various kinds of conflict resolution metapolicies. ASL seems to lack any method for expressing stateful policies.
The KeyNote system [3] was designed to help implement distributed authorization and access control system. A focus of KeyNote is the handling of delegation and the authentication of attestations via cryptographic signatures. KeyNote has programming-language aspects, but its programming model is quite weak, consisting of little more than boolean conditions over atomic data like strings and numbers. KeyNote was designed to run in resource-constrained environments; in contrast, SUPPL emphasizes expressivity and programmability over implementation efficiency.
The Flow-based Management Language (FML) [17] is a declarative language for managing enterprise network configuration. An FML policy is expressed as a set of implication rules, based on nonrecursive DATALOG with negation. There is no internal notion of state. The language design is tailored to support efficient (linear time) evaluation. Conflicts can be resolved either by ordering rules or by assigning priorities to primitive actions.
Procera [24] is a domain specific language (embedded in Haskell) for expressing networking policy using the framework of functional reactive programming. In this framework, one defines a policy program (conceptually) as a timevarying function from an infinite stream of input events to a stream of output events. Aside from the quite different programming model, Procera's status as an embedded DSL makes it more difficult to build static analysis tools, as any analyses must be able to handle essentially all of the constructs of the host language, Haskell, a large general-purpose language in its own right.
FLIP [25] is a high-level firewall configuration policy language. It allows policies to be written in terms of high-level service-oriented goals rather than packet-level access control rules. FLIP has built-in concepts of network domains, services, and hierarchical policy groups, which abstract over the rules associated with a security roles. It uses the semantics of these concepts to prevent or resolve conflicts statically.
Conflict detection and resolution Conflict resolution has been studied in the context of PDL [7] . The PDL conflict resolution system allows users to declare the conditions under which a conflict occurs. At runtime, conflicts can be handled in a number of different ways by writing conflict monitors. These may resolve conflicts by choosing actions with higher priorities, by canceling all effects of the event causing the conflict, etc. Policy monitors are not expressible in PDL itself, but must be defined externally. SUPPL avoids the tricky issue of conflict resolution by passing it off instead to the external system we already assume must exist. Instead, we have concentrated our efforts on building a system to help users discover potential conflicts in their policies statically.
Dunlop et al. [14] present a system for both detecting and dynamically resolving policy conflicts. In their system, policies are stated using operators of deontic logic-in particular, modal operators for permission, prohibition and obligations. They propose a number of strategies for resolving conflicts at runtime (explicit priority values, new policy overrides old, specific policy overrides general, etc.) and suggest that no one strategy is appropriate for all uses.
Ananthanarayanan et al. [1] examine a system for policies and conflict resolution which is broadly similar to that of Dunlop et al. It deals with policies based on permissions and obligations. Their system is specifically designed to deal with issues that arise from privacy policies and is built on top of IBM's DB2 Content Manager and IBM Records Manager.
Conclusion
SUPPL is a programming language designed from the ground up for expressing and reasoning about event-conditionaction policies over arbitrary domains. It combines the power and simplicity of pure logic programming, used for describing conditions, with the flexibility and familiarity of imperative programming, use to connect events to actions. The language has been implemented and integrated into several Java-based network security applications. We are actively working to apply it in additional domains.
Perhaps the most important benefit of having a dedicated language for authoring policies is the opportunity to apply sophisticated static analyses to detect errors before the policy is fielded. We have developed a prototype of one such analysis, which discovers conflicts caused by inconsistent actions, making essential use of an external logic solver. As future work, we plan to extend this prototype-in particular, by improving the quality of feedback from the external solver to the programmer-and to apply the same approach to other static analyses, such as liveness or functional correctness.
